Rivista del Diritto Commerciale e del diritto generale delle Obbligazioni

NICCOLO' BACCETTI

Non-proportional de-mergers between Individual rights and veto powers

Non-proportional de-mergers between Individual rights and veto powers (NICCOLO' BACCETTI)

Abstract: This article addresses the issues raised by non-proportional de-mergers of joint stock companies splitting up shareholders into different beneficiary entities. A discussion is engaged as to whether such de-mergers must be approved with the unanimous consent of all shareholders or may also be approved by shareholders’ majority required to resolve on by-laws amendments. In the latter case, minority shareholders not concurring with the resolution would be entitled to withdraw from the company. In this framework, an analysis is developed to show how Italian corporate law has increasingly replaced an approach on minorities’ protection based on the assignment of individual rights and veto powers, with a different regime founded on the majority rule and the assignment of exit rights to minorities. Finally, the article focuses on possible reasons underlying the Italian corporate rule requiring the unanimous consent of all shareholders for approval of asymmetrical demergers (pursuant to which shareholders are assigned shares of the demerged company in lieu of the shares of the beneficiary entities).

Summary: 1. La scissione estrema nella recente giurisprudenza di merito. Il problema della tutela delle minoranze tra scissione non proporzionale e scissione asimmetrica. – 2. Gli orientamenti che ampliano l’ambito di applicazione della disciplina della scissione asimmetrica. – 3. Considerazioni critiche. Profili di incoerenza con l’evoluzione della disciplina della scissione. – 4. (Segue): il generale indebolimento delle posizioni soggettive del socio di fronte al potere dispositivo della maggioranza. Dal potere di veto al disinvestimento. – 5. L’equivalenza sostanziale tra scissione estrema e scissione non proporzionale ai fini della tutela delle minoranze. – 6. Le possibili ragioni del consenso unanime nella scissione asimmetrica e il suo ambito di applicazione.

Keywords: Non-proportional de-mergersUnanimous consent of all shareholdersIndividual rights and veto powers.

Year 2021 Booklet 3 Page 433

ISSN 2532-9839 | 2532-9847
IT EN

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